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FOREWORD
The Middle East and North Africa might not be the
first region that comes to mind when one contemplates
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To
many, the Alliance was founded largely to unite Europe
and North America, and to counter threats emerging
from the Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War changed
these assumptions—not least to be proven by NATO’s
Operation in Libya in 2011, sanctioned by the League of
Arab States.
In this monograph, Dr. Florence Gaub describes how
the region has moved from the rim of the Alliance’s security perspective toward a more nuanced vision that
recognizes the region’s role in an ever-changing and
more-complex world. NATO has understood the security implications emerging from the changes taking place
among its southern neighbors and the need for dialogue
and cooperation. Dr. Gaub gives not only an overview of
the different frameworks of cooperation that NATO has
with the Middle East and North Africa, but also explains
their evolution and potential.
As the Arab world is undergoing change on an unprecedented scale, NATO’s need for dialogue and exchange with this part of the world is even more important than before. Yet, there are obstacles along the way:
burdened by historical precursors, NATO’s strategic
communication, and the use of antagonistic rhetoric tapping into the Clash of Civilizations, the Alliance faces a
number of challenges in its cooperation with its southern partners.
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SUMMARY
While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) was founded in 1949 first and foremost to
strengthen the transatlantic link in the wake of the Soviet threat, one of the immediate neighboring regions
was left largely unnoticed for the Alliance’s first 4
decades. Although some of the Allies had recognized
the importance of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, it was dealt with largely on a bilateral
basis. Events such as the Suez crisis of 1956 and the
wars of 1967 and 1973 did have an impact on NATO
and its cohesion, overall its focus remained on the
Central Front in Germany. This was where a Soviet attack would have likely occurred, and led to an Allied
bias in geographic terms.
Although the southern allies recognized the importance of the region for NATO’s security, they failed
to set the agenda within the Alliance to a significant
extent. This was not helped by the fact that some of
the southern allies (such as Greece and Turkey) had
their own conflicts to deal with, or were not part of
NATO’s integrated command structure (such as Spain
and France). The Alliance blindness to the strategic
relevance of the Middle East and North Africa is thus
an outcome of not only a strategic bias in favor of the
Central Front, but also of issues internal to the Alliance.
These situations changed with the end of the Cold
War. The invasion of Kuwait and subsequent war
against Iraq, promising developments in the IsraeliPalestinian peace process, and the establishment of
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program designed for
European states all created circumstances conducive
for the launch of a similar network with the Alliance’s
southern neighbors.
vii

As the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was born in
1994, it counted initially five member states (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Israel) and had no
political ambitions beyond the exchange of views and
information. Yet, as the MD grew with the inclusion
first of Jordan and later Algeria, it served as an important platform for the Alliance’s other outreach efforts,
which received further input in 2004. Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the invasion of
Iraq, and the discovery of a potential nuclear program
in Iran, the region received renewed attention from
the Allies. While the MD was elevated to the status
of partnership, a separate program was developed for
the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The invitation to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
(ICI) has been accepted by Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but has received
no official response from Saudi Arabia and Oman.
Both frameworks are decidedly more ambitious than
the original dialogue and aim not only for political but
also military cooperation and interoperability. In addition, the Alliance initiated its first training mission
in Iraq. A small endeavor of 150 people, it contributed
particularly to the formation of the new Iraqi security
forces’ officer corps. Initial contact was also established with the League of Arab States. By the time the
Arab Spring began, NATO had established relations
with half of the League’s member states.
Yet a few states remain outside of NATO’s network
with the MENA region; this fact alone reflects accurately the binary relations most Allies, particularly the
United States, have with the region’s governments.
The fact that Libya, Lebanon, and Syria (and originally Algeria) were excluded from the MD although
they are Mediterranean states is a clear indication of
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political relationships in disarray. While the absence
of Lebanon and Syria is clearly connected to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Libyan case is a
result of decades of support to international terrorism.
As a result of these difficulties, NATO has attempted to work around existing conflicts within
and without the region, be it the Western Sahara issue between Algeria and Morocco or the Palestinian
conflict. In spite of these attempts, the Alliance’s relationships are affected by low levels of political and
economic integration in the region proper as a result
of high- and low-intensity conflicts. In addition, the
existing partnerships are hampered by NATO’s rather
negative image on the public level. This is in part due
to a lack of distinction between the Alliance as a collective and its individual member states. A history
of colonization (France, Spain, Italy, and the United
Kingdom) and bilateral interventionism has created
with the wider public an ambiance of distrust, which
affects NATO as well, although the Alliance itself intervened in the region only in 2011, and then with a
mandate from the League of Arab States. Nevertheless, NATO is frequently seen as an expansionist tool
and not to be trusted. This image is particularly fueled by the Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan, which
is seen as an anti-Muslim operation, as well as by the
lack of support for the Palestinian cause. In addition,
NATO itself has struggled to adjust to the region in
partnership terms: translations into Arabic as well as
Arabic-speaking personnel are scarce, and within the
Alliance there are divergent views of the region’s relevance to Allied security.
Yet, in times of transnational challenges, such as
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration, climate change, and energy se-
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curity, NATO has no other choice but to extend its
understanding of security beyond traditional lines.
Defense and security cannot be understood in territorial terms any longer; only in a comprehensive
manner can both NATO and its partners confront the
challenges of the 21st century. It is precisely for this
reason that the Alliance will continue to improve the
existing relationships and overcome the remaining
challenges—conflict, war, and security are not matters
of choice, but of necessity.

x

AGAINST ALL ODDS:
RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND
THE MENA REGION
An analysis of current relations linking the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) prompts the observation that the likelihood of such ties developing in the
first place must have seemed at best remote. Too substantial were (and still are) the differences between
the institution embodying the Transatlantic Link and
the Arab world; too extensive were the mutual suspicions; and too great was the historical burden, which
weighed on such relations from the outset. And yet,
against all odds, a web of relationships developed
from 1991 onward and continues to grow, culminating in 2011 in the first NATO operation in an Arab
country—Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP)
in Libya, sanctioned by the League of Arab States,
and assisted by four Arab countries (Morocco, Jordan,
United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Qatar). Relations
between the Alliance and the Arab world have thus
made an about-turn in the space of 2 decades. Yet,
while profound progress has been made, a number of
obstacles remain on the way to a comprehensive relationship between NATO and the vast region ranging
from Mauritania to Iraq.
NEIGHBORS WITHOUT CONTACT: NATO AND
THE MENA REGION BEFORE 1991
To say that the Middle East and North Africa at
one time did not matter at all to NATO would be an
exaggeration, and yet, it is to a certain extent true. As
NATO’s creation in 1949 was intended to counter the
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threat of the Soviet Union to the Free World, the Mediterranean and adjacent regions occupied a secondary
place among the priorities of the Alliance’s founding
fathers. Yet, they were not completely absent from the
agenda: the question of Italian membership was closely connected to Mediterranean security, as was that
of the French territories in North Africa. Although
NATO felt that a Member State mostly surrounded
by the Mediterranean Sea would distract from the
Atlantic outlook of the Alliance, Italy was included
among the founding Allies, since it was feared that
its exclusion would strengthen the country’s Communist party.1 Thus, NATO had a definite Mediterranean
component with French, Italian, and later Greek and
Turkish membership. This ultimately resulted in the
creation of Armed Forces South (AFSOUTH), a command dedicated solely to the Mediterranean region.
Yet, although almost a third of NATO’s members during the Cold War bordered on the Mediterranean (as
compared to a fifth today, following large intakes from
Eastern Europe), they failed to formulate a coherent
vision and strategy for the adjacent MENA region and
thus shape NATO’s approach to it as a whole. France’s
and Spain’s long-standing absence from the Alliance’s
integrated military structure contributed to this, as did
the tensions between Greece and Turkey, mainly over
Cyprus. In addition, the Allies with a strong interest
in the region, such as France, Great Britain, and the
United States, favored engagement with the MENA
region outside the NATO context.
This attitude was fueled by the perception that
NATO as a mutual defense alliance was not supposed
to act outside the territory of its Member States (the
so-called out-of-area debate). The MENA region, being outside the territory of NATO member states, did
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not play an independent role during the Cold War,
when security was envisioned in a rather classical
perspective. Territoriality, and attacks on it, were the
dominant theme, and thus left no room for a grasp
of security going beyond this. As a consequence, the
MENA region was seen first and foremost as a possible sideshow in the antagonism between communism
and capitalism. After attempts to create a Middle Eastern counterpart to NATO failed, Greece and Turkey
were invited to join the Alliance in 1952—as in the
case of Italy, concern with potential expansion of Soviet influence overruled the Alliance’s vocational concentration on Western Europe.2 By the same token, the
Eisenhower Doctrine, issued in 1957 as a reaction to
the Suez War of 1956, offered military and economic
support to Middle Eastern states threatened by Soviet
influence.3 This followed the example of the Truman
Doctrine of 1947, which had offered the same sort of
assistance to Greece and Turkey. The MENA region
was thus seen, in Western eyes, only as an area where
expanding Soviet influence could cause a greater
threat to the West.
Indeed, within the North Atlantic Alliance, security and defense were seen solely through the prism
of the Soviet threat, and major emphasis was placed
on the so-called Central Front (known as the “Central
Front bias”) to the detriment of other regions such as
the South. Structurally, this perspective could be seen
in the limited attention NATO Headquarters gave to
the MENA region, monitored by an Expert Working
Group that later evolved into a slightly more political
Ad Hoc Group. Meeting only twice a year for 2 days
at the expert level,4 “neither group proved as active,
informed or forward-looking as events warranted.”5
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The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 slightly
changed the stance on out-of-area concerns: the Soviet
Union’s strong support to Egypt and its breaking off
of relations with Israel in 1967 enhanced the region’s
status as a Cold War sideshow. As a reaction to American military support to Israel, the Arab members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) imposed an oil embargo, highlighting European dependency on the region’s energy supplies—at
the time, 80 percent of Europe’s oil came from Arab
countries.6 Most importantly, the conflict also brought
to the forefront the rift that ran through the Alliance
when it came to Middle Eastern policy: most European Allies (except for Portugal and the Netherlands)
denied the United States access to their national facilities to supply Israel, whereas the United States put its
global forces on nuclear alert without prior consultation in the North Atlantic Council.7
While neither crisis led to an active NATO role in
the region, the Alliance nevertheless acknowledged
the importance of world regions other than Eastern
Europe, thereby reducing its strict “in-area” policy
somewhat. The 1974 summit declaration included the
Allies’ statement of their resolve to “keep each other
fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank
and timely consultations by all means which may be
appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind
that these interests can be affected by events in other
areas of the world.”8 The Alliance realized that the
Arab world could no longer be overlooked as a strategic region.
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A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND
THE ARAB WORLD: AN OVERVIEW
The established vision of the Middle East and
North Africa as a mere sideshow in the Cold War
changed in the early 1990s: the collapse of the Soviet
Union removed the threat of the Warsaw Pact, the
Gulf War against Iraq highlighted the importance of
the MENA region for Allied security (independent of
any Soviet threat), and the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process was thought at the time to indicate an era of
stability ahead.
Thus, the Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 in
Rome acknowledged the region as a whole for the
first time in Alliance history: “The Allies also wish
to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations
with the countries in the southern Mediterranean and
Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries
on the southern periphery of Europe are important
for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war
has shown.”9 In addition, the Concept recognized the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
in the region as a potential threat. Forty-two years after NATO’s creation, the region thus emerged in the
Allied strategic vision, as stated in the North Atlantic
Council Communiqué of 1993: “Security in Europe is
greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean.”10
The interdependence of security had finally been acknowledged by the Alliance, and an out-of-area role
for NATO was soon after confirmed with its engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.
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The Mediterranean Dialogue.
After the Cold War came to an end, the Alliance
entered a new era in which concepts of security, territoriality, and defense were rethought. Former Warsaw Pact members entered first the Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program, and eventually the Alliance
itself. A timid engagement with the Mediterranean
region emerged in the form of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), which came into being toward the end of
1994. While some Allies, particularly Italy and Spain,
were pushing for a full-blown partnership structure
like the far-reaching PfP program dedicated to European states, most were concerned that NATO would
be overburdened by reaching out in two different
directions. This meant that the MD was at first little
more than a consultative forum, its stated aims being
“to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean as a whole, to achieve better mutual understanding and to correct any misunderstandings of the
Alliance’s purposes that could lead to a perception of
threat.”11 In other words, the goal of the Dialogue is to
deconstruct the myth of an Alliance searching for new
enemies, and to dispel fears that a new European security structure might exclude—and harm—its southern
neighbors. By the same token, the Dialogue seeks to
improve Allied understanding of Partner Countries’
security perceptions and concerns—a feature that had
not existed throughout the Cold War, when the Alliance understood Middle Eastern security merely as
an extension of East-West antagonism, or worse, of its
own security.12
The original members of the MD were chosen by
consensus in the Alliance. This is an important point,
as it explains why the first MENA partners of NATO
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were all states considered stable and friendly toward
the West—Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Israel
and, a few months later, Jordan. The criterion has been
bemoaned by MD members, who would have liked to
see Syria, Lebanon, and Libya (under Gaddafi) invited
as well.
The Dialogue started timidly and was designed
from the outset to evolve. Originally limited to twiceyearly meetings between Brussels, Belgium, embassies,
and members of NATO Headquarters’ international
staff, the bilateral forum developed over the years into
a more substantial cooperation. First elevated into a
separate Committee involving representatives of the
Alliance’s Member States, the MD progressively became more significant in both military and political
terms. In 2000, Algeria was invited to join; in 2004, the
Dialogue was elevated to the status of a full partnership. A policy document called for a more ambitious
and expanded framework, including high-level political meetings, military interoperability, and defense
reform.13 The menu of practical cooperation activities
was increased from just a handful of items to several
hundred, offering seminars, workshops, and courses
in areas such as civil emergency planning, scientific
and environmental affairs, crisis management, defense
policy and strategy, small arms and light weapons, and
proliferation. A number of meetings have now been
held at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of
Defense, as well as of Chiefs of Defense. In addition,
officers and civil servants from MD countries have for
some years been attending seminars, workshops, and
courses at NATO Headquarters, the NATO Defense
College, and the NATO School Oberammergau. MD
countries can observe NATO military exercises, and
their participation can be funded by the Alliance.
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When the Alliance drafted its new Strategic Concept in 2010, MD member states were consulted. A
trust fund was created to contribute to the elimination
of explosive remnants of war in Jordan, and another
fund exists to destroy obsolete and unserviceable munitions, build adequate storage sites for remaining
munitions, enhance specialized personnel skills, and
provide training for the reintegration of military personnel returning to civilian life.14 Most importantly,
MD countries (Morocco and Jordan) have contributed
to NATO operations in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. Six of the seven MD countries have concluded
Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs, designed to deepen their relationship with NATO by offering tailored advice on reforms.
Overall, the MD thus seems like a successful
program, especially when one considers the circumstances in which it was initiated. However, the comparison with efforts like the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC) involving the 28 Allies and 22 PfP
Partners makes it clear that the Dialogue is more of
a confidence-building measure than a real partnership. The Alliance has failed so far to develop jointly
defined challenges with its Mediterranean partners,
or determine the benefits for both sides involved in
the partnership. As a result, NATO’s intentions in the
region are not always clear; this continues to be a hindrance, particularly at the political level.
As the MD is based on an imbalance between supply and demand, NATO remains its driving force. This
is partly the result of the Partners not understanding
fully what the Alliance can offer, but also of the silence
maintained by their security community and their
total lack of a common strategic voice. In addition,
though the Alliance is politico-military in nature, 90

8

percent of its cooperation with these countries is military, indicating difficulties in improving the political
aspect of the partnership. Despite the considerable
progress made between the Alliance and its Mediterranean partners, there is thus room for improvement.
Possible synergies could be developed with a second
partnership that NATO created in the MENA region
in 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
September 11, 2001 (9/11) affected the Alliance’s
relationship with the MENA region significantly.
Where some Member States (particularly Germany,
Canada, and the Scandinavian countries) had previously doubted the relevance and importance of the
MD, the tragic events of that day spurred the realization that dialogue and cooperation with this region
were vital for Allied security. The invasion of Iraq in
2003, its subsequent instability, the shift of the balance
of power toward Iran, and Iran’s likely quest for a nuclear weapon added to the perceived need for stability
in the Gulf region, encouraging the hope that transatlantic engagement would foster it. As then NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared on a
visit to Qatar in 2005, “This region faces formidable security challenges. Several countries in this region have
been the target of terrorist attacks. And your immediate neighborhood remains a flashpoint of unresolved
regional issues, of proliferation risks, and of political
and religious extremism.”15
As a consequence, the Istanbul Summit of 2004
launched a partnership with the countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), inviting all of them to
join. To date only Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait
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have done so, while Saudi Arabia and Oman (which
together account for 70 percent of the Gulf peninsula’s
defense spending) have so far proved reluctant.
Compared to the MD, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) focuses less on mutual understanding and
dispelling of misperceptions; instead, the emphasis is
on contributing to “regional security and stability”16
in the broader Middle East region. From the outset,
the Initiative thus took a noticeably more practical approach in the security area rather than focusing on the
deconstruction of mutual suspicions. In part, this was
due to the previous engagement with the MD, which
allowed the Alliance to build on established mechanisms and tools. In addition, the Gulf States’ initial
interest in NATO was rather greater than in the case
of the MD: since they had already pursued a strategic
internationalization of their security (e.g., by concluding bilateral agreements with France, Britain, and the
United States), a relationship with the Alliance could
be seen as another card in the deck to achieve this goal.
Yet, there is also distrust and a lack of understanding
regarding the way NATO functions, which ultimately has prevented the Initiative from reaching its full
potential. The Initiative’s rather prominent practical
component and its bilateral rather than multilateral
framework are what distinguish it from the MD.
NATO outreach in the MENA region is further
complemented by its Training and Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2006 with the aim of making NATO’s
training expertise more widely available to its regional interlocutors.17 This was what had been done after
the end of the Cold War in offering advice and support on security sector reform to all former Warsaw
Pact members seeking to join the Alliance, a rather
successful contribution to transformation in the states
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concerned. Niche expertise of this kind has resulted
in education and training, effectively becoming a diplomatic tool in the Alliance’s portfolio—the training
mission in Iraq being an important example of such
activity. Education and training are attractive tools,
as they allow for a certain level of engagement when
the time might not be ripe for political acceptance of a
partnership agreement. As an example, Saudi Arabia,
which has so far not accepted the invitation to join the
ICI, is participating in seminars, courses and conferences, which could be seen as indicative of tentative
engagement.
So far, the ICI has failed to develop the depth and
strength anticipated. There is to date no framework
document and no established military forum; in spite
of the Initiative’s strong emphasis on military cooperation, the level of participation in the activities concerned (such as seminars, workshops, mutual visits,
and participation in exercises) is low. In 2008, the ICI
states participated in 57 cooperation activities (25 by
the UAE, 13 by Qatar, 12 by Bahrain, and 7 by Kuwait)—while this is a 72 percent increase compared
to 2005, it is still only 10 percent of the total activities
offered.18 At the same time, NATO has tripled its offer
on activities that are largely (85 percent) of a military
nature. To date, there have been no regular meetings
at the level of Defense Ministers or Foreign Ministers,
and no Individual Partnership Cooperation Program
has been concluded with any of the states involved.
This stands in stark contrast to active participation
by three of the four ICI states in NATO’s operations—
Qatar and the UAE in the Libya Operation, and the
UAE and Bahrain in the International Stabilization
and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In addition, NATO has intelligence-sharing agreements with
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the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain. This seems to indicate
that the problem in deepening military cooperation
is not merely political but also structural. The Gulf
armed forces engaged with NATO are rather small in
size, ranging from 8,200 troops in Bahrain, to 11,800
in Qatar, 15,500 in Kuwait, and 51,000 in the UAE.19
Hence, their personnel pool is rather limited, particularly when it comes to the officer level.
More importantly, the ICI suffers from the absence
of Oman and, to an even greater extent, Saudi Arabia—the Gulf giant in terms not only of size, but also
of political and economic influence. The inclusion of
these absentees would give the Initiative the credibility and visibility necessary for its success. For this
reason, the Alliance has kept the door open to both
states, and Saudi Arabia has started sending officers
to attend the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at
the Alliance’s Defense College.
There are several reasons that explain why these
countries have not joined. Oman’s foreign policy traditionally seeks to maintain the fragile balance entailed in its close relations with Iran and its peninsular
neighbors, while Saudi Arabia prefers bilateral ties
and is generally concerned about foreign military on
its territory.
Overall, the Gulf States have failed to devise a
coherent strategic vision themselves: the common
defense force Al-Jazeera Shield, consisting of 7,000
troops and theoretically designed as an intervention
force in the event of an attack, has therefore remained
weak, although it was used in 2011 to quell uprisings
in Bahrain. Strategic cooperation remains limited if the
parties involved have unclear ideas about the overall
goal.
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This explains, in part, why the MD and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative remain separate—despite
the cultural and historic connections, the security concerns, the strategic vision, and therefore the approach
to defense in the states concerned are not the same.
The Special Case: The Structured Security
Cooperation Framework in Iraq.
Although the invasion of Iraq did not take place
under the NATO flag, some might argue that it hurt
the Alliance’s cohesion more than anything else since
its foundation, since the Allies disagreed over the justification for it. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to
NATO at the time, termed the invasion “a near-death
experience.”20 Nevertheless, the Allies agreed in 2005
to respond to a request by the Iraqi government to assist with the training of its new security forces. NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) is not only the
first of its kind, it is also the gateway to a stronger and
longer-lasting relationship between the Alliance and
the so-called Eastern gate of the Arab world.
NTM-I is small in size (150 troops), and not a combat mission. Folded into the American training effort
(the two share a commander), its niche contribution
focuses almost exclusively on the Iraqi Army’s officer
corps, although a substantial number of Italian Carabinieri—about two thirds of the mission overall—
contribute to training the Internal Security Forces
under this umbrella as well. Assistance in rebuilding
the different levels of officer education, be it the Staff
College, the War College, or the National Defense
College; advice in the development of education programs; and the establishment of a noncommissioned
officer (NCO) corps are all part of NTM-I’s portfolio.
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Despite its limited size, this mission works at a
crucial junction in the newly emerging Iraqi security
sector. Armed forces rely for their functioning on the
officer corps; large numbers of enlisted personnel cannot fulfill their duties without the leadership and guidance provided by the officers commanding them. Yet,
this is exactly where the Iraqi Armed Forces are currently challenged; 157 percent of its enlisted personnel
requirements are filled, as opposed to only 73 percent
coverage at the officer level.21 Since the disbanding of
the old Iraqi armed forces, the new security structures
have had to grow at an impressive speed; 14,000 new
troops were brought in every 5 weeks in 2007, and the
comprehensive De-Ba'athification program, originally
designed to dismiss all former Iraqi military members
above the rank of colonel, had to be curtailed. Today,
about 70 percent of the country’s officer corps had
served in the old Iraqi military.
In this context, training and education are the
key elements in securing the new structure. NTMI’s efforts seem to pale alongside the American contribution: 2,500 officer cadets, 200 NCOs, 460 Joint
Staff College officer graduates, and 1,800 individuals trained abroad at the NATO Defense College,
the NATO School Oberammergau, the Joint Warfare
Center Stavanger, and the Center of Excellence in the
Defense against Terrorism22 seem a rather limited contribution, considering the overall manning level of
nearly 200,000 troops and about 20,000 officers. Yet,
training can be effective only in units with existing
structures and experienced officers, NCOs, and team
members—all of which are currently understaffed by
the Iraqi army. NATO’s limited efforts are thus providing a contribution where it really counts. In total,
NTM-I is a rather inexpensive mission, with a budget
of 22.5 million euros per year. The mission’s future,
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both in terms of scope and finances, will depend on
the situation after the U.S. withdrawal at the end of
2011.
As the mission has relied heavily on U.S. force
protection and logistics, it is not clear how it will be
affected by the American withdrawal from Iraq. In the
context of the negotiations between the U.S. and Iraqi
governments regarding the stay of American trainers
on Iraqi soil beyond the withdrawal (approximately
between 8,000 and 25,000 trainers), Baghdad indicated
a possible extension under the NATO mission.23 This
hints at a preference for the Alliance, as its multinational character and its low level of visibility in Iraq in
general have made it more acceptable to the population. Politically and legally speaking, the mission has
moved from United Nations (UN) Resolution 1546 to
a Structured Cooperation Framework between NATO
and Iraq; this very likely serves as the first stepping
stone toward a more comprehensive relationship between the two, which could ultimately result in a partnership within, or outside, the ICI framework.
The Missing Links: Libya, Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine.
While it is useful to assess NATO’s existing relations with the MENA region, it is equally interesting
to take a closer look at the states with which it has
none. Although the Alliance has now developed some
kind of relationship with 11 Arab countries (which is
half of the Arab League’s members) plus Israel, and
has extended invitations to two more (Oman and Saudi Arabia), a number of states are missing from the
network. These states fall broadly into two categories:
those that can be deemed as politically unreliable or
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unfriendly to NATO, and those that are too weak in
their statehood to forge a relationship with the Alliance.
The first category comprises Syria, Libya (before
the 2011 operation), and Iraq (before 2004). Not surprisingly, these were all part of the list of “rogue
states” established in the late 1990s and, as such, considered a threat to world peace.24 The list coincided
to a considerable extent with what John R. Bolton,
then U.S. Ambassador to the UN, referred to in 2002
as the “Axis of Evil”25—states seen to be sponsors of
terrorism and in pursuit of WMDs. The absence of
Syria and Libya clearly reflects the bilateral relationship most Allies have, or had, with those two states
outside the Allied context. While programs similar to
NATO’s outreach initiatives into the region, such as
the Five plus Five Dialogue between five European
and five Maghreb countries or the European Union’s
(EU) Union for the Mediterranean, do not ostracize
Libya or Syria, the Alliance’s approach to both of these
states has been strongly influenced by two elements:
continuing American reservations about them, and
their own reservations toward the Alliance.
This becomes particularly evident in the case of
Libya: while UN sanctions for the support of terrorism and pursuit of a program to develop WMDs made
initial Libyan membership of the MD out of the question at the inception of the MD in 1994, things changed
after 2003. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had already
agreed a few years earlier to hand over the suspects
charged with the Lockerbie terrorist attack to a court
in the Netherlands, and to compensate the families of
the victims of Lockerbie and Niger. Eventually, he also
agreed to destroy all chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The state was thus considered repentant
and welcomed back into the international community.
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Yet, while the suggestion that Libya be invited to
join the MD circulated briefly, it never materialized
because the regime was not interested; considering
the very negative attitude the Libyan government expressed at the time of the Dialogue’s foundation, this
can hardly be considered a surprise. Gaddafi even
threatened to launch a jihad in the event of NATO
expansion into North Africa, warning his Maghreb
neighbors of foreign interference in their affairs as a
result of the MD.26 Prospects are different under a new
Libyan government, which has benefited greatly from
the Alliance’s support. In March 2011 NATO decided
to implement the military aspects of UN Resolution
1973, adopted after an appeal to the UN Security
Council by the League of Arab States, calling for a nofly zone, a maritime arms embargo, and the protection
of civilians.27
The position adopted by the Arab League following a violent uprising against the Gaddafi regime was
the regional green light that enabled the UN Security
Council to issue the resolution calling for the protection of civilians, and prepared the way for NATO to
address the military needs arising as a consequence of
this resolution. Politically, it seems very unlikely that
the Alliance would have taken on this mission without
the strong regional support shown in this case. During
Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the Alliance was
assisted by partner states from the region, namely, the
UAE, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar. It is important to
point out that the mandate ruled ground troops out,
and was enacted solely from the air and sea.
Gaddafi’s regime finally fell after 7 months of
operations, and a new provisional government has
emerged that seems to have a rather positive attitude
toward the Alliance—so much so that the head of the
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Libyan Transitional National Council has asked the
Allies to extend their mission until the end of 2011 in
order to control surplus weapons and deal with possible Gaddafi loyalists who might still be active.28 While
further engagement by the Alliance will be limited (a
training mission, as in Iraq, is conceivable), Libyan involvement in the MD or in a different framework of
partnership is now a distinct possibility, thus closing
the North African gap in the program.
The foreseeable evolution in Libya’s relations with
the Alliance is unlikely to repeat itself in the case of
Syria. Although some Syrian opposition members
called on NATO to act following the violent crackdown on the wave of protests in late 2011,29 there is
no appetite in the Alliance to engage in a situation
that is very different from that in Libya in a number
of respects—absence of a UN or League of Arab States
mandate, an immediate, neighborhood with a NATO
country (Turkey), strong relations with Iran, much
more developed military capabilities, and a possible
spillover effect into a region already under tension are
all reasons not to engage in this case. Most importantly,
in contrast to the Libyan National Transitional Council, the Syrian opposition has not made a concerted
call on NATO. Regardless of the events surrounding
the Arab Spring, Syria has not had any relations with
the Alliance, although it did have some contacts with
the EU. Syria’s isolation, particularly vis-à-vis the
United States, stems among other things from its belligerence toward its neighbor Israel, but also from its
long-standing occupation of Lebanon and its hostility
toward other Arab states (such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
and Jordan). In this context, Syrian absence from any
Allied framework is a logical continuation of its own
foreign policy.
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The case of the three other states that have no relationship with NATO—Lebanon, the Palestinian
Authority, and Yemen—is slightly different; their
absence can be understood as a result of their weak
statehood rather than a definite stance toward the Alliance. Lebanon, a multi-religious state that brought
15 years of civil war to an end in 1990, only to remain
occupied by Syrian forces and various militia groups,
was—and still is—considered a Syrian vassal state in
spite of the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. The presence
of the Shia militia organization Hezbollah, an ally of
Syria and Iran, was not only the reason for Israel’s
invasion in 2006, but it has also undermined Lebanon’s credibility as a strong state that acts independently from Syria. Lebanon’s opposition toward a UN
resolution condemning the violence in Syria in 2011
continues a long tradition of aligning its politics with
those of its neighbor. It thus comes as no surprise that
neither NATO nor Lebanon are really at all interested
in a partnership with each other. In addition, Lebanon—like Syria—is still officially at war with Israel
and, while all three states are members of the Union
for the Mediterranean, relevant business within the
Union has been largely blocked because of the ongoing conflict.
Nevertheless, a possible role for NATO was voiced
in the media in 2006 for a Lebanon peacekeeping force
after the war between Israel and Hezbollah.30 Actually, nothing came of the proposal as a result of budgetary restrictions, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan
and, most importantly, the absence of regional support for such an option. Instead, the existing UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was expanded, with
15,000 troops from 36 nations (of which 14 happen to
be NATO Allies).31
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Another case in point is the Palestinian Authority, also absent from formal relations with NATO.
While Palestine has been recognized by eight NATO
Allies,32 there is no unified position in the Alliance
on the conflict, or, rather, on its resolution. Though
all Allies support the two-state solution, there is no
unanimous consensus on how to achieve it. Nevertheless, NATO opened exploratory information contacts
with the Palestinian Authority in 2005, as the Istanbul
Summit declaration had clearly stated that it would
not exclude its future participation in any of the Alliance’s partnership frameworks.33 Yet, this never materialized, because the Israeli war with Lebanon in 2006
and the hostilities on the Gaza strip in 2008 and 2009
brought the peace process to a complete halt after it
had been kept on hold for some time.
However, a role for NATO in the resolution of the
conflict has been mentioned several times, more outside than inside the Alliance. For example, the option
of an international peacekeeping force for Palestine
after a peace agreement featured in the 2000 Clinton
parameters, and New York Times journalist Thomas
Friedman suggested that such a role would be perfect
for NATO. The idea has been pushed several times by,
among others, former National Security Advisor to
President Barack Obama and former Supreme Allied
Commander Europe James Jones; however, it remains
unpopular with a number of NATO Allies, who fear
the political danger of such a mission.34 As a consequence, then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer declared in January 2009 that three preconditions would have to be fulfilled before one could even
think about a role for NATO in Palestine. These are
a comprehensive peace agreement, the consent of the
parties, and a UN mandate—not to mention NATO

20

consensus.35 Considering the high political visibility
of such a mission, and its difficulties in terms of military feasibility, the time is not ripe for the Alliance to
take on a mission in Palestine, or on the Golan Heights
for that matter.36
The last state missing from the web of relations is
Yemen, alone among the Arabian Peninsula states in
not being invited to join the ICI in 2004. The reason
that Yemen was left out is that it is not a member of
the GCC, despite its repeated attempts to join. From
the perspective of both the GCC and the ICI, prospects
for stabilization are grim in a state as close to collapse
as Yemen. Half of its population lives below the poverty line, its petroleum resources are declining, and its
security sector is in disarray. Yemen is thus hardly in a
position to become a viable partner, particularly since
the uprisings of 2011 that brought it close to another
civil war.
In addition to these missing states, NATO has no
formal relations with the League of Arab States, an
organization that represents 22 Arab countries and
was founded in 1945. Yet, in 2008, the League’s then
Secretary General, Amr Moussa, visited NATO Headquarters; visits to the League Secretariat by NATO
delegations of different levels have taken place, and
the League has been sending course members to the
NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the Alliance’s
Defense College in Rome since 2010. While the relationship is timid at this stage, the League’s call for a
no-fly zone over Libya was seen as the regional green
light for NATO to take action there. Therefore, the
League’s political support cannot be overestimated.
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OBSTACLES ON THE WAY AHEAD
Formally, NATO has achieved a lot in the space of
17 years: it has increased its relations with the MENA
region from 0 to 11, has regional partners participating in a number of its operations and, in 2011, even
started hosting permanent missions of these partners
in its Headquarters—the UAE was the first to open
one.37 Yet, while all looks good on paper, relations are
not as profound as they could be, especially in comparison with the Alliance’s PfP program. To date,
there is no founding document between NATO and
its southern partners; there is no standing multilateral
consultation forum like the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council, which brings the Alliance and its PfP partners together on a monthly basis at the ambassadorial
level, and annually at the level of Foreign or Defense
Ministers and Chiefs of Defense. There is no military
forum with the partners of the ICI, and no high-level
meetings. In other words, there is room for improvement.
Three main reasons have obstructed the deepening of existing relations: the Alliance’s negative image in the region; a limited understanding of it within
NATO; and the low- (and high-) intensity conflicts
and diverging security interests that characterize the
region.
Addressing the Problems of a Negative Image.
The Alliance was well aware of its own image in
the region when it created its first timid outreach activities there in the form of the MD, as its stated goal
included the correction of misunderstandings.38 Early
on, NATO Headquarters had realized that diplomatic
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or military cooperation with these states would be
very difficult, given the many negative connotations
associated with the Alliance in the region. A number
of root causes were, and still are, responsible for this:
the historically burdened relationship with a number
of NATO Allies, the lack of differentiation between
the Alliance as a collective and its individual member
states, the impact of the Cold War, inadequate strategic communication by NATO, and a general perception in the Arab world that the Alliance had identified
Islam as the next enemy now that the Soviet Union has
fallen.
Although the North Atlantic Alliance as such was
of course not a colonial enterprise, a number of Member States—France, Great Britain, and Italy as founder
Allies, later joined by Spain—had colonized parts of
North Africa and the Middle East. Almost all the Arab
states, except for Saudi Arabia, had been occupied at
some point in the 19th and 20th centuries by one or
several European powers; many of them had previously been part of the Ottoman Empire—in a sense
the forerunner of modern Turkey, also a NATO nation. It goes without saying that experiences with colonialism have not been positive. Algeria, at the time
of the Alliance’s creation still a part of France and
specifically mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty,
fought a bloody and protracted war for independence;
Britain oversaw Jewish migration into Palestine and
sanctioned the creation of a Jewish state with the Balfour Declaration of 1917; Italy fought a long war of
suppression in Libya.
American influence on the Alliance meant that, as
a collective, it took a clear stand toward colonialism
early on. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty specifies that the Allies’ collective defense agreement ap-
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plies in the event of armed attack “on the territory of
any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the
Algerian Departments of France [this section became
inapplicable as of June 1962], on the territory of or on
the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of
Cancer.”39 While the Tropic of Cancer lies just south of
Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, the explicit reference to the
North Atlantic area makes it clear that mutual defense
in practice excludes territories such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt—although Allied forces at the
time of the Treaty were posted in them (British forces
on the Suez Canal), controlled them in part or completely (France in Tunisia and parts of Morocco), or
claimed ownership over them (as in the case of Italy,
which accepted the end of its Libyan territories only
in 1949, when the Bevin Sforza Plan failed).40 This exclusion from the treaty area did not take into account
the strong interest of the European colonial powers,
particularly France, in including the territories concerned.41 Nevertheless, the Alliance should not be seen
as an anti-colonial club either; while the Algerian war
was not actively supported by NATO, NATO’s silent
acquiescence is seen by Algerians today as a form of
support—regardless of the fact that the war frustrated
France’s relations with the other Allies and eventually
led to its withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military
structure in 1966.42 When decolonization became imminent, France and Britain agreed at a NATO Council
meeting to secure control of strategic installations in
the MENA region—for the Alliance’s security, not just
their own.43 While the era of colonialism came to an
end (except in the case of Portugal) rather early in the
Alliance’s history, its heritage nevertheless affected,
and continues to affect, the Alliance’s relations with
the former colonies of individual Allies.
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This is exacerbated by the fact that there is significant conflation of “the West” and NATO, as well
as by action within the MENA region by individual
Member States and by the Alliance as a whole. In 1956,
Great Britain and France conspired with Israel against
Egypt, which had just nationalized the Suez Canal; in
1967, the United States supported Israel logistically
during the war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; in
1986, the United States bombed Libya as a reaction to
Libyan-supported terrorist attacks in Berlin; in 1991,
an international coalition including almost all NATO
Allies at the time (except for Germany and Turkey)
liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Likewise, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq are conducted by
a number of states that are also members of NATO. It
was not NATO, the collective Alliance, that undertook
these actions, but in the general Arab public eye this
makes no difference. These actions are seen as part of
a larger paradigm in which the West conspires against
the East, seeking to control its trade routes and access
to oil.44
The sense of grievance that has permeated the
region since the end of World War I and the double
standards applied to international law (be it for the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the pursuit of WMD)
have resulted in a difficult relationship marked by distrust on the Arab side. The sense of victimization has
been further exacerbated by the sensation that 9/11
has been exploited to initiate a crusade (as former
President George W. Bush named the War on Terror)45
against Muslims. The death of over 10,000 civilians in
Afghanistan,46 where NATO has led the ISAF since
2002, combined with the statement of then NATO
Secretary General Willy Claes that Islamic fundamentalism had emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to
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Western security since the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe,47 did much to strengthen the impression that the Alliance was hunting Muslims.
This impression disregards several facts. To begin with, Claes’s comment caused a strong reaction
among the Allies (particularly Turkey, a largely Muslim country), forcing him to retract his statement immediately and declare that Islamic fundamentalism
would “not even be on the agenda when we talk to
these countries [the countries of the Mediterranean
Dialogue],”48 since as religious fundamentalism of
any kind was not a concern for NATO. Second, the
Alliance has in Albania (since 2009) and Turkey two
Member States that are largely Muslim. Third, NATO
intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, and in
Kosovo in 1999, to save Muslim lives. However, the
current perception, built on decades of mutual distrust, is that NATO is an imperialist, militarist bloc
seeking the domination of Arab states. NATO’s image
is thus the victim of a more widespread antagonism
between the “Western” and the Arab worlds.49
Improving Understanding of the Region.
It is not just the population of Arab states that has
misperceptions about NATO. There is an equally incomplete—and to a certain extent mistaken—comprehension of the region in general by NATO, or rather,
by the various Allies. While the Alliance’s headquarters has built up a dedicated (albeit small) division for
its MD and ICI partners, and an equally small faculty
in its Defense College in Rome, there is difficulty in
focusing on a region so diverse and yet so homogenous—a challenge that Edward Said has famously
termed as Orientalism, the difficulty of Western schol-
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ars and thinkers in understanding and analyzing the
region for what it is rather than for what one wants it
to be.50 While such a perspective has been criticized,
misunderstandings between East and West do exist.
The difficulty of understanding the combination of
similarities and differences characterizing the region
as a whole emerges in a number of respects. Apart
from Iran, Turkey, and Israel, the region includes a
large number of Arab states. These share a range of
linguistic, social, and cultural traits, as well as a common history, but at the same time differ vastly with
regard to such parameters as size, economy, political
systems, ethnic and religious makeup, international
relations, geography, and educational standards. In
other words, while looking similar on the surface,
these states differ markedly along crucial points. As
a result, approaches to the region have to strike a difficult balance between adopting too broad or too narrow a perspective. This is particularly visible in NATO’s partnership programs, which divide the region
along geographic lines according to whether the states
concerned border on the Mediterranean or the Arabian Gulf. While critics see this division as a refusal
to deal with the region as a whole in a comprehensive
manner, some Arab states actually show a preference
for this separation.
Overall, partner states have complained that their
security needs and their strategic cultures have not
been sufficiently understood by NATO; this is particularly the case in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian
issue, which most regional states view as a platform
for other security issues, such as terrorism, political
fundamentalism, migration, and nonstate security actors. The fact that the Alliance prefers to work around
the issue rather than solve it is seen as a failure to understand how much is at stake.
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A Region of Crisis.
Finally, the relationship between NATO and its
Arab partners is marred by the same factors that have
impeded the region’s development in the past: the
presence of a number of ongoing or recent conflicts (be
it the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Western Sahara,
Iraq-Iran, or Iraq-Kuwait) and protracted instability
(best seen during the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia,
Syria, and Yemen) make cooperation with the states
concerned difficult. Conflict and instability not only
engender political issues such as lack of legitimacy
and human rights abuses, but also impede economic
development by discouraging investors, prompting a
brain drain, and slowing infrastructure development.
In the Arab world, this has led to the world’s lowest
rates of political and economic integration (less than
2 percent of the North African countries’ trade is inter-Maghreb51). Conflict also affects cooperation with
NATO in a number of ways.
For a start, the limited finances of a number of the
MD countries impede participation at seminars and
workshops. The self-funding principle of the Alliance
has been curtailed as a result, with NATO occasionally funding between 80 percent and 100 percent of
participation for countries below a certain Gross Domestic Income. Another issue is an educational concern, a direct outcome of the generally underperforming educational sector in the Arab world. English at a
working level is not widespread in the Arab partner
countries; in North Africa, French is widely spoken
to a reasonably good level,52 but the same is not true
of NATO Member States (although French is one of
the Alliance’s two official languages). In small frameworks, such as the NATO Defense College’s dedicated
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Middle East faculty, continuous interpretation into
English, Arabic, and French is provided at a considerable cost; the same is not always possible during operations and exercises, with obvious effects on communication and, ultimately, on the effectiveness of the
Alliance’s outreach efforts.
NATO has (albeit still to a very limited degree)
started to feature translation into Arabic of some items
it posts on the Internet, reflecting the Alliance’s awareness that language remains an issue when communicating with this region. This was particularly visible
during the Alliance’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya: while the Arabic content of the NATO
website itself remained minimal, as the Alliance does
not have a standing team of Arabic interpreters and
translators, videos in Arabic were posted on a separate
YouTube Channel named “Natoarabic.”53 That access
to the channel remained relatively infrequent—3,300
visits after the beginning of the operation, as compared to almost 1 million in English—and can be partly explained by the low level of Internet access in the
region (estimated at 10 percent in North Africa and 57
percent in the Gulf, compared to about 80 percent in
the Western world54), but also by the absence of direct
links to this channel on NATO’s main website.
The final section of this monograph will briefly
examine the reasons for which, notwithstanding the
challenges to be addressed in the MENA region, its
relationship with NATO is one that will continue to
develop.
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AGAINST ALL ODDS: RELATIONS BETWEEN
NATO AND THE MENA REGION
In spite of the obstacles listed above, the relationship between NATO and the MENA region is expected to deepen. To begin with, geographic proximity is
not a matter of choice: Syria and Iraq both border on
a NATO country; it is no more than 468 miles from
Algiers to Marseille, 375 miles from Rome to Tunis,
and 477 miles from Ankara to Damascus. In addition,
the region boasts 65.4 percent of the world’s oil reserves and is one of the most important trade routes
linking the Western to the Eastern Hemisphere. Not
only oil but also goods from Asia find their way to
Europe along this route—one that is quite vulnerable,
since it harbors seven chokepoints between the Strait
of Hormuz and Gibraltar, making it very easy to shut
the whole route down, as Egypt did in 1967.
These are not the only reasons for which the region is important. Political turmoil in the form of wars
(both civil and interstate), coups d’état, insurgencies,
and terrorism shook the region to the core in the last
century, accelerating transformation and resulting in
an unstable construct that is of strategic concern to
NATO. Allies are concerned about the proliferation of
WMDs in the region, about new interstate wars, failed
states, immigration, civil war, and, of course, terrorism spilling over from this region into NATO Member
States. All of this is taking place in NATO’s immediate
neighborhood, along its southern flank. The Alliance
thus has more strategic interest in this region than in
any other—as recognized by the Americans in particular, though they are geographically far removed
from it.55 In other words, the Southern Front is now
the Central Front of the Alliance’s strategic interest.
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This explains why the Alliance has, in the past 15
years, shown great adaptability to circumstances in
its two partnership programs. NATO realized early
on that further cooperation with the region was hampered by a range of misunderstandings, giving the Alliance a rather negative image. The aim of the MD was
thus, from the outset, the deconstruction of mutual
misperceptions rather than military cooperation—as
the latter could not be achieved without the former.
The correct identification of the problem was the first
step toward closer cooperation, and eventually partnership.
Most importantly, both NATO and the states in the
region have a long list of common security interests;
partnership can create a win-win situation that aims
at a cooperative rather than an antagonistic security
scenario. Security across the globe is now interlinked;
in the complexity of the modern world, it is no longer
divisible but needs to be tackled collectively. In spite
of historical and cultural obstacles, the Alliance and
its immediate southern neighborhood will thus come
together out of strategic necessity for their mutual
benefit.
In order to achieve this, NATO will have to negotiate the hurdles detailed above. Improving Strategic
Communication with this region of the world would
be a first step toward overcoming the rather negative
image of the Alliance; as the Internet is not widespread in the region (with the exception of the Gulf),
public diplomacy should focus on television as the
primary means for communication. In addition, the
Allies should develop a coherent vision—and thus a
strategy—for the Middle East and North Africa. What
has hampered NATO’s engagement in the past was in
part a result of the Allies’ divergent visions of the re-
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gion, or the preference for bilateral engagement. The
Alliance’s operation in Libya could be an indication
that there is readiness now to manage relations with
the MENA region within NATO. Furthermore, Allies
should invest in subject matter expertise within Alliance structures and draw on this in times of crisis.
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